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RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT OF
AN EMPLOYEE: A PROPOSAL IN
THE WAKE OF FILM RECOVERY
SYSTEMS TO MAKE THE BOSS
RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS CRIMES*
On February 10, 1983, Stefan Golab, a vat worker at a silver
reclamation plant in Illinois, died of acute cyanide toxicity.'
Over two years later, an Illinois circuit court judge held three
corporate decisionmakers guilty of murder.2 The court found the
corporate president, plant manager, and plant foreman
guilty-not for intentionally pulling the trigger of a gun, nor for
negligently allowing an accidental death, but for knowingly cre-
ating and maintaining workplace conditions in which employees
would probably die or be injured.'
In People v. Film Recovery Systems, the court sought an ef-
fective means, within current enforcement structures, to prevent
unjustifiable risks to employee health. It extended traditional
criminal law principles to a corporation and its agents. For the
first time, a court convicted individual corporate executives of
murder for the daily operations of a manufacturing facility.4
Public reactions to Film Recovery Systems have been mixed.
Some observers have argued that the verdict is inappropriate
and unjust, contending that management decisions should not
result in murder convictions. Others have agreed with the
* The author wishes to thank Jed Stone and Joseph Vining for their encouragement
and helpful criticism of earlier versions of this Note.
1. People v. Film Recovery Systems, No. 83-11091, slip op. at 5 (Cook County, Ill.
Cir. Ct. June 14, 1985) (consolidating People v. O'Neil, No. 84-5064), argued, Nos. 85-
1853, 85-1855 (Ill. Ct. App. July 7, 1987).
2. Id. at 10.
3. Id. at 7-10.
4. Ranii, Verdict May Spur Industrial Probes, Nat'l L.J., July 1, 1985, at 3, col. 2;
Greenhouse, 3 Executives Convicted of Murder for Unsafe Workplace Conditions, N.Y.
Times, June 15, 1985, at Al, col. 5. In People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414
N.E.2d 660 (1980), four corporate officials were indicted for second degree manslaughter
and criminally negligent homicide. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed all four
indictments. Id. at 307, 414 N.E.2d at 666.
5. See, e.g., Ranii, supra note 4, at 8, col. 3; Greenhouse, Business and the
Law-Responsibility For Job Safety, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1985, at D2, col. 1.
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court's decision, contending that criminal sanctions are appro-
priate for such egregious acts of endangerment.6 This public re-
action mirrors the tension in the courts between a traditional
reluctance to review corporate management decisions, particu-
larly through the application of the criminal law, and the need
for a standardized judicial response to work-related employee
deaths and injuries.
Since the Film Recovery Systems decision, prosecutors have
begun to pursue more actively the application of criminal laws
to individual corporate actors. The case itself offers proof that
the three traditional mechanisms-the regulatory, civil, and
criminal systems-have proved incapable of deterring culpable
behavior, reforming culpable parties, or punishing culpable con-
duct. It exemplifies a search for some way to adapt current ap-
proaches to deter, reform, and punish the conduct of corporate
decisionmakers to protect employee safety and health in the
workplace. In short, the Film Recovery Systems decision high-
lights the need for a workable approach to employee
endangerment.
This Note argues that the traditional regulatory, civil, and
criminal mechanisms are both ineffective and inappropriate to
deter or punish corporate decisionmakers for decisions that pose
risks to the safety or health of employees in the workplace. The
Note proposes a new criminal offense to prevent and punish cul-
pable corporate decisionmaking that results in employee deaths
or injuries. Part I explains the novel application of the tradi-
tional murder offense in Film Recovery Systems and demon-
strates that the case fails to lay the foundation for a standard-
ized response to employee endangerment. Part II analyzes the
traditional responses of the regulatory and civil systems to work-
related employee deaths. Because the regulatory and civil mech-
anisms have proved ineffective in dealing with employee-endan-
6. See, e.g., Ranii, supra note 4, at 8, col. 3; Greenhouse, supra note 4, at Al, col. 6,
A29, col. 2.
7. See Comment, Corporations Can Kill Too: After Film Recovery, Are Individuals
Accountable for Corporate Crimes?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1411, 1411-12 n.2 (1986) (citing
United States v. Greer, No. 85-105-CR-ORL-18 (M.D. Fla. filed Dec. 17, 1985) (charging
defendant with "knowingly placing employees in danger of death or serious bodily injury
by causing illegal disposal of chemical wastes"); State v. Autumn Hills Convalescent
Nursing Home, No. 85-CR-2526 (Bexar County Ct. of Tex. Apr. 2, 1986) (hung jury dis-
missing a nursing home, president, vice president, and five employees charged with mur-
der by neglect of an elderly nursing home patient)); Cummings, All 5 Acquitted in 3
Deaths on Film Set, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1987, at 8, col. 4 (reporting Director John
Landis' acquittal of involuntary manslaughter charges that resulted from a helicopter
crash on a movie set while Twilight Zone was filmed); see also, Stone, More Execs Face
Charges Over Job Safety, Chi. Tribune, Apr. 26, 1987, § 7, at 14A, col. 1.
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gering activities, prosecutors are looking to criminal law solu-
tions. Part III reviews the traditional criminal law mechanisms
available to prosecutors and shows why these are inadequate to
deter and punish activities that endanger employees. Part IV
suggests a statutory solution, the Reckless Endangerment of an
Employee Offense, to respond more effectively to corporate deci-
sions that wrongfully endanger the health and safety of
employees.
I. People v. Film Recovery Systems
On February 10, 1983, Stefan Golab left his position in the vat
tank area of the Film Recovery Systems plant.8 He walked into
the lunchroom and began shaking violently.9 Shortly thereafter,
the sixty-one year old Polish immigrant collapsed and died.'0
The medical examiner established the cause of death as acute
cyanide toxicity."
After a two month bench trial, Judge Ronald Banks found the
then-bankrupt Film Recovery Systems, Inc., and Metallic Mar-
keting Systems, Inc., its fifty percent shareholder," guilty of in-
voluntary manslaughter and fourteen counts of reckless con-
duct. s In addition, the court found three corporate officials,
Stephan O'Neil, the former president of both corporations,
Charles Kirschbaum, the plant manager, and Daniel Rodriguez,
the plant foreman, guilty of murder and fourteen counts of reck-
less conduct.'4 The verdict represented the first murder convic-
8. Gibson, Are the Bosses to Blame? A Worker's Death Spurs Murder Trial, Nat'l
L.J., May 20, 1985, at 6, col. 1. The now-bankrupt Illinois corporation engaged in the
extraction of silver from used photographic film. Id.; 3 Executives Get 25 Years in
Worker's Death, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1985, at All, col. 5 [hereinafter Executives Get 25
Years].
9. Gibson, supra note 8, at 6, col. 1.
10. Id.
11. People v. Film Recovery Systems, No. 83-11091, slip op. at 5 (Cook County, Ill.
Cir. Ct., June 14, 1985), argued, Nos. 85-1853, 85-1855 (Ill. Ct. App. July 7, 1987). Judge
Banks accepted the medical examiner's and toxicologist's report concluding that Golab
had a blood cyanide level of 3.45 micrograms per milliliter, a lethal level. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Id. at 11. The court fined each corporate defendant $10,000 for involuntary man-
slaughter and $1,000 for each of the 14 counts of reckless conduct. Executives Get 25
Years, supra note 8, at All, col. 6.
14. Film Recovery Systems, slip op. at 10; Executives Get 25 Years, supra note 8, at
All, col. 6. The court later sentenced the three corporate officials to 25 years in prison
and fined each defendant $10,000 on the murder count. Id. at All, col. 4. Each defend-
ant also received 364 days in jail for each reckless conduct charge. These 14 jail terms
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tion of individual corporate executives for corporate decisions
leading to the work-related death of an employee.1"
The findings in Film Recovery Systems are as shocking as its
result is surprising. Judge Banks ruled that the death of Mr. Go-
lab was not an accident, but rather the natural result of condi-
tions that the defendants knew presented life-threatening risks
to their employees. 6 He accepted the medical examiner's con-
clusion that Mr. Golab died of acute cyanide toxicity resulting
from critically dangerous levels of hydrogen cyanide gas in the
plant's air. 17 Judge Banks concluded that the plant conditions
were "totally unsafe"' 8 and that the defendants failed to provide
sufficient operating instructions or sufficient warnings."9
were to be served concurrently. Id. at All, col. 5. The defendants have appealed the
decision.
The Illinois murder statute applied by the court states:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if,
in performing the act which causes death:
(1) He either intends to kill or to do great bodily harm to that individual or
another or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another;
or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bod-
ily harm to that individual or another ....
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(a)(1)-(2) (Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp. 1987) (repealed
July 1, 1987).
In 1987, Illinois amended the murder statute. It elevated the murder offense to first
degree murder and replaced voluntary manslaughter with second degree murder. Act ap-
proved January 5, 1987, P.A. 84-1450, § 2, 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 343 (West) (codified at
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(a)(l)-(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)).
15. Greenhouse, supra note 4, at A29, col. 3. Furthermore, this case represents the
first time prosecutors have ever tried corporate executives on such murder charges. Id.
16. Film Recovery Systems, slip op. at 7-9.
17. Id. at 5-6.
18. Id. at 6. Prosecutors alleged that cyanide emissions levels were double those al-
lowed under federal standards. Gibson, supra note 8, at 6, col. 1. Judge Banks cited the
symptoms of the officers conducting the investigation of the plant immediately following
Golab's death-nausea, burning throats and eyes, difficult breathing, and other symp-
toms normally associated with hydrogen cyanide inhalation-as additional evidence of
contaminated air. He also relied on the testimony of the workers, insurance inspectors,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) investigators, and other independent witnesses as supplementary evidence
reinforcing his conclusion that the conditions in the plant caused Golab's death. Film
Recovery Systems, slip op. at 5-6.
Furthermore, prosecutors alleged emissions control equipment, designed to protect
workers processing the remaining film and installed after authorities had shut down the
plant, cut cyanide emissions to one-twentieth of the previous levels. Gibson, supra note
8, at 6, col. 2.
19. Film Recovery Systems, slip op. at 6-7. Regarding the failure to warn employees
of the dangers, Judge Banks noted that the few warning signs posted in the plant were
written exclusively in English and Spanish even though many employees, including Go-
lab, were Polish immigrants who lacked any ability to speak, read, or write either lan-
guage. Id. The court therefore presumed many employees lacked any knowledge of the
potential danger. Id. at 7.
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The court held the defendants to be "totally knowledgeable in
the dangers which are associated with the use of cyanide."20 La-
bels on the drums of sodium cyanide delivered to the factory
indicated that contact with cyanide could be fatal.21 Witnesses
alleged that the defendants actively sought to conceal these dan-
gers from plant employees.22 In addition, the court found that
the executives knew employees became nauseated after working
over the vats containing the cyanide solution. 2 The court ruled
that, in light of this knowledge, allowing the continued use of
the cyanide solution without appropriate safety precautions was
equivalent to acting with knowledge that a strong probability of
death or bodily injury would result. Therefore, the court con-
victed the corporate agents of murder.24
Prosecution of corporate agents under the murder statute was
unprecedented. 25 Although corporations and their agents are
subject increasingly to criminal prosecutions, most such actions
allege white-collar crimes-such as antitrust violations, tax eva-
Judge Banks' emphasis on management's failure to warn the employees of the work-
place dangers and on other evidence of the employees' ignorance of these dangers is
curious. Because assumption of risk is not a defense to a criminal action, W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.11 (2d ed. 1986), the defendants could have been indicted
and convicted even if the employees were fully apprised and cognizant of the dangers of
working with cyanide. The court's concern about employee knowledge, although not re-
flecting a potential legal defense, may reflect a hesitation to punish corporate agents
when employees knowingly choose to take the risks. This hesitation may affect the likeli-
hood of prosecution and conviction. When employees knew of the dangers but, because
of high unemployment or an absence of alternatives in a company town, for example,
chose to work despite this knowledge, this hesitation should not affect decisions to prose-
cute or convict corporate agents.
20. Film Recovery Systems, slip op. at 7-8.
21. The labels warned that the contents could prove fatal by three means-ingestion
of the compound, absorption of the compound into the skin, or inhalation of the gas
produced when the compound was mixed with any weak alkali, such as water, as was
done at the Film Recovery Systems plant. Id. at 7.
22. Some employees claimed that management had scraped the skull and crossbones
warning symbols off many of the cyanide canisters. Greenhouse, supra note 5, at D2, col.
1. A former bookkeeper for the corporation testified that the defendants ordered her to
avoid using the word "cyanide" when speaking to plant workers. Gibson, supra note 8, at
6, col. 2. It is unclear how much weight Judge Banks placed on this testimony. The
opinion specifies that the verdict was based most significantly on the findings listed
therein but that the court considered all of the evidence presented. Film Recovery Sys-
tems, slip op. at 4. This and similar testimony probably influenced the court's view of the
defendants' blameworthiness.
23. Film Recovery Systems, slip op. at 8.
24. Id. at 9. The defendants were charged with murder under the knowledge stan-
dard of the Illinois murder statute. See supra note 14. They were held responsible for
both affirmative acts and omissions. Film Recovery Systems, slip op. at 9.
25. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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sion, and mail fraud.26 Even where the wrongful activity might
have given rise to felony indictments, prosecutors generally have
charged corporations and their agents with misdemeanors only.2
7
Film Recovery Systems is unique in convicting white-collar em-
ployees of murder-a felony traditionally associated with vio-
lence or specific homicidal intent.
The novel application of the traditional law of homicide in
Film Recovery Systems may be a product of frustration with the
failure of regulatory attempts to protect against hazardous work
environments. The case signals corporate managers that prose-
cutors and courts are beginning to look to the criminal law for a
more effective way to provide workers with a safe environment
and to inform them of any remaining dangers. 2 Although it may
26. See, e.g., United States v. E.F. Hutton, No. CR 85-000-83 (M.D. Pa. May 2, 1985)
(subsidiary of The E.F. Hutton Group, Inc. pleading guilty to 2000 criminal counts of
participating in bank overdrafting schemes); see also Shenon, Senate to Study Handling
by U.S. of Prosecution of Corporations, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 6 (report-
ing that, in United States v. General Electric, the corporation pleaded guilty to federal
charges of making false statements regarding military contracts and three General Elec-
tric managers were indicted on felony charges and that in United States v. Eli Lilly, the
corporation pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges of failing to disclose deaths linked to
the arthritis drug Oraflex and one executive pleaded no contest to similar charges); En-
gelberg, U.S. Aide Says GTE Case is Part of Crackdown, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at
D8, col. 1 (reporting that GTE Government Systems Corporation pleaded guilty to ille-
gally conspiring to obtain Department of Defense documents and that two individuals
were charged with theft and espionage while a third Was charged with conspiracy).
27. See, e.g., Shenon, Dispute over Intent in Drug Case Divided F.D.A. and Justice
Dept., N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1985, at Al, cols. 4-5 (Justice Department charging
SmithKline Beckman and three individuals with misdemeanors-14 counts of failing to
notify the FDA and 20 counts of falsely labeling the drug Selacryn-despite FDA recom-
mendations for felony charges for failing to disclose adverse drug reactions). Congres-
sional concern regarding the prosecutorial discretion of the Justice Department
prompted the Senate Judiciary and other congressional committees to study the Depart-
ment's handling of corporate crime. Id. at A28, col. 1; see Sterngold, The Undoing of
Robert Fomon, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1985, § 3, at Fl, cols. 2-3.
28. Richard M. Daley, Cook County State's Attorney, suggested that the convictions
are a statement to employees and employers that "the criminal justice system can and
will step in to protect the rights of every worker to a safe environment and to be in-
formed of any hazards that might exist in the workplace." Ranii, supra note 4, at 8, col.
3; see also Stone, supra note 7, at 14A, col. 1.
Further, right-to-know rules indicate additional efforts to inform employees of work-
place hazards. Promulgated by OSHA in 1983 as regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, and
adopted by the majority of state legislatures, such rules require employers to inform
employees who handle dangerous materials of the risks of their employment. Both fed-
eral and state provisions include administrative hearings and sanctions. See BUREAU OF
NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., RIGHT-TO-KNOw: A REGULATORY UPDATE ON PROVIDING CHEMICAL
HAZARD INFORMATION (1985). Illinois enacted the Toxic Substances Disclosure to Em-
ployees Act on December 8, 1983. Act approved Sept. 8, 1983, P.A. 83-240, 1983 Ill. Laws
1877 (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1401-1420 (Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp.
1987)). The Act requires employers to label and maintain safety data information on
chemicals listed as toxic by the Illinois Department of Labor and to train and educate
their employees. Id.; BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., supra, at 115. Because the Act was
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not lead to a landslide of indictments,29 Film Recovery Systems
has opened the door for prosecutors to respond to industrial ca-
sualties and deaths with traditional criminal homicide actions.30
Film Recovery Systems is an exceptional case. It involved a
small corporation where the subsequently convicted officials had
continuous interaction with the activities in the plant,' em-
ployed and exploited illegal aliens,32 and, most importantly,
knew of and concealed gross dangers. 3 Whether the criminal
homicide standards will apply or should apply to cases involving
officials who have limited contact with the risk-creating activity
and have otherwise clean hands or to cases involving more subtle
dangers remain open questions. 4 Until these questions are an-
swered, the extreme facts of Film Recovery Systems and the
likely inability of corporate executives to identify with those
convicted in Illinois may minimize the deterrent effect of the
case in all but the most egregious instances of employee
endangerment.3 5
adopted after the plant closed, the disclosure statute did not apply to the Film Recovery
Systems defendants. Violations of right-to-know statutes and criminal statutes are inde-
pendent offenses. Although violation of a right-to-know statute may be evidence in a
homicide case, compliance with a right-to-know statute should not be a legal defense to
charges stemming from the work-related death of an employee. See supra note 19.
29. Several experts have suggested that few indictments will follow the Film Recov-
ery Systems verdict. Joseph E. Hadley, Jr., a corporate lawyer specializing in health and
safety issues, viewed the unusual facts of the case as limiting the threat of criminal ac-
tions to egregious situations. Greenhouse, supra note 4, at A29, col. 2. Where the job is
inherently dangerous-some construction jobs, for example-prosecutors may hesitate to
prosecute individuals "unless the danger has been allowed to grow out of control."
Greenhouse, supra note 5, at D2, col. 2. One of the Film Recovery Systems prosecutors,
Jay C. Magnuson, suggested that problems in proving causation, arising because of the
diffusion of responsibility in the modern corporation, may limit the number of criminal
convictions attainable. Professor Shelvin Singer cited additional difficulties in prosecut-
ing offenders because prosecutors with limited resources must combat well-funded corpo-
rate defense attorneys. Ranii, supra note 4, at 8, col. 4; see infra notes 114-18 and ac-
companying text.
30. Ronald J. Allen, criminal law professor at Northwestern University Law School,
suggested that the psychological impact of the case is important: "It will sensitize prose-
cutors to the possibility of bringing this type of action." He predicted that the number of
cases will increase with time. Greenhouse, supra note 4, at A29, col. 4.
31. Ranii, supra note 4, at 8, col. 4.
32. Prosecutors also alleged that the company hired illegal aliens because the corpo-
rate managers suspected that the employees would not complain to authorities. Gibson,
supra note 8, at 6, col. 2. This allegation suggests knowledge of the dangers to employees
and may have colored the perception of the trier of fact regarding the defendants'
culpability.
33. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
34. Greenhouse, supra note 5, at D2, col. 3.
35. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union job-safety specialist, Sylvia Krekel,
predicted the limited deterrent effect of the decision on corporate agents. She said,
"Most businessmen regard themselves in a lot different light from [Film Recovery Sys-
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II. REGULATORY AND CIVIL RESPONSES TO EMPLOYEE
ENDANGERMENT: THE TREND TOWARD CRIMINALIZATION
The tension created between the demand for risk taking and
the desire to protect the lives and health of employees involved
in dangerous activities has led to the passage of workers' com-
pensation statutes and the adoption of a variety of regulations
seeking to ensure safety in the workplace.3 Although the regula-
tory approach has decreased many risks significantly, the courts
must continue to handle the consequences of the remaining
risks.
Civil remedies supplement extensive regulation of the work-
place. The civil law approach has not prevented employee-en-
dangering activities. Despite burgeoning civil judgments against
corporate defendants, corporate decisionmakers assessing the
need for precautionary measures too often find that the cost-effi-
cient solution is also the most dangerous for their employees."
A. The Regulatory Approach
Regulatory initiatives approach employee endangerment with
two goals-compensation and deterrence. Workers' compensa-
tion statutes address the compensatory objective.3 8 The deter-
rence objective relies principally on the Occupational Safety and
Health Act.3 9 Neither goal has been met.
1. Compensation- State workers' compensation statutes es-
tablish an insurance program to compensate individuals for
work-related injuries. Typically, the programs guarantee benefits
to an employee for personal injuries "arising out of and in the
course of employment. '4 These benefits normally include both
wage-based compensation or death benefits and hospital and
tems, Inc.] .... They're not going to feel enough identity with those guys for the case
to have much of a deterrent effect." Id. at D2, col. 2.
36. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982
& Supp. III 1985); Workers' Compensation Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138.1-.30
(Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp. 1987); Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 418.101-.941 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW (McKin-
ney 1965 & Supp. 1987).
37. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
38. See generally supra note 36 (citing examples of workers' compensation statutes).
39. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp.
11 1985); see infra notes 48-70 and accompanying text.
40. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10, at 1 (1985).
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medical expenses.4 1 Issues of fault and negligence are irrelevant
because entitlement to benefits arises from the mere fact of in-
jury.42 There is a trade-off, however, between certainty of recov-
ery and the amount of benefits. Employees receiving workers'
compensation benefits must generally relinquish common law
claims for recovery. Thus, assured but limited workers' compen-
sation benefits often replace uncertain but open-ended tort
recoveries.43
Workers' compensation statutes do not provide a solution to
employee endangerment. From a compensatory perspective, the
statutes arguably are successful. Still, many commentators note
that recovery schedules are sorely inadequate, compensating em-
ployees for their medical expenses, but not for their full disabil-
ity losses.44 Furthermore, workers' compensation functions as a
program of insurance, not as one of prevention or deterrence.
Indeed, the statutes may serve to encourage employee endanger-
ment. Because the employer's premiums are generally set indus-
trywide and are not based on the individual firm's safety record,
the current program provides no incentive for individual em-
ployers to maintain safe workplaces. Instead, it provides a per-
verse incentive, allowing firms to cut back on worker protections
to minimize operating costs without an accompanying increase
in potential liability.45 Even when merit ratings reduce the pre-
miums for firms with good safety records, the premium reduc-
tion is normally so insignificant that it provides little incentive
to improve working conditions.
46
In addition, workers' compensation focuses on injuries from
accidents and fails to address long-term health hazards ade-
quately.47 Therefore, employers who operate workplaces contain-
ing carcinogens, asbestos, or other substances whose dangerous-
ness increases with long-term exposure have little, if any,
incentive to minimize the dangers. The overall result is a com-
41. Id. at 1-2.
42. Id. at 1.
43. Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Workplace Hazards: A Viable Option for
Enforcing Workplace Safety?, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 183, 192 (1986). Workers' compensa-
tion may not be the exclusive remedy where an employer has committed an intentional
tort or, in a relatively new and not widespread exception, where the employer's conduct
was willful, wanton, or reckless. Id. at 193 (citing Mandolis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d
907, 914 (W. Va. 1978)). Thus, where the employer's conduct is proved blameworthy,
employees might receive both workers' compensation and tort recoveries. Id.
44. Id. at 192, 194-95.
45. Id. at 194; Viscusi, Reforming OSHA Regulation of Workplace Risks, in REGULA-
TORY REFORM 234, 240 (L. Weiss & M. Klass eds. 1986).
46. Note, supra note 43, at 194 & n.55.
47. Viscusi, supra note 45, at 240-41.
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pensatory system that allows employees to recoup their medical
expenses as well as a portion of their long-term disability losses,
but permits employers to continue to imperil the health and
welfare of their work forces.
2. Deterrence- In order to prevent employee endangerment,
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act in
1970.8 The purpose of the Act was "to assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources."49 It
requires each employer to "furnish to each of his employees em-
ployment and a place of employment which are free from recog-
nized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees" and to comply with reg-
ulations promulgated by OSHA.6 0
The drafters recognized that market competition may pre-
clude worker protection. That is, competition between firms en-
courages employers to cut costs, and in doing so, discourages
employers from providing a safe environment." Government in-
tervention, therefore, is necessary to force individual employers
to internalize their costs by imposing safety requirements
industrywide.2
To be effective, the drafters knew OSHA would have to create
incentives for employers to provide safe workplaces. Regulatory
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
49. Id. § 651(b).
50. Id. § 654(a). The Act grants the Secretary of Labor the authority to promulgate
these regulations. Id. § 655.
51.
[Pirofit-maximizing incentives of individual firms can provide inadequate moti-
vation even in highly competitive markets to vindicate certain values of broad
social import . . . .Indeed, most regulation dealing with these issues (e.g., the
FDA, OSHA, and EPA variety) assumes that competition is workable and that
under its pressure individual firms will not willingly incur the additional costs
necessary to protect society from the undesirable by-products of economic
activity.
Industry Regulation Commission of the American Bar Association, Report on Regulatory
Reform by the Industry Regulation Committee of the American Bar Association Sec-
tion of Antitrust Law, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 503, 508 (1985).
52. At an American Enterprise Forum discussing OSHA regulation, Mark J. Green,
the former director of Congress Watch, stated:
The problem was not that these manufacturers were bad people; the problem
was that companies were afraid to be at a cost disadvantage if they did some-
thing special. The result is that the manufacturers wait for a government regula-
tion insisting on safety so that all manufacturers suffer the same cost, and then
the benefit can be distributed massively throughout society.
AMERICAN ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, HEALTH, SAFETY, & ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: How EFFECTIVE? 4 (1980) (American Enterprise Institute Forum).
[VOL. 20:3
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safety incentives serve to supplement those of the market."3
Compliance, however, is likely only where the expected costs of
honoring OSHA regulations are less than or equal to the ex-
pected costs of punishment. The expected costs of punishment
are a function of the probability of inspection, the expected
number of violations detected, and the average penalty per vio-
lation."' Because each of these figures is low, compliance is un-
likely to occur.
5
Insufficient penalties are an important factor in OSHA's inef-
fectiveness in dealing with employee endangerment. Fines for vi-
olations often pale in comparison to the costs of compliance. To
be effective, efforts to deter particular activities must include
sanctions proportional to anticipated compliance costs.56  Fur-
thermore, current practices make ineffective sanctions even
more impotent. Under the Reagan administration, average pen-
53. Viscusi, supra note 45, at 237. One theory suggests that the market responds to
risky employment by compensating at higher wages those employees willing to accept
riskier jobs. Id. That is, workers demand a wage premium for diminished safety. Id. at
240. This compensating wage differential theory assumes that workers are aware of and
respond rationally to risk. Id. at 239. Inadequate information and irrational responses to
uncertainties, however, combined with the relatively weak bargaining power of many em-
ployees and the externalities discussed above, prevent the market from adequately deter-
ring employee endangerment. Id. at 242-45.
For a more comprehensive discussion of wage differentials due to job risks, see Olson,
An Analysis of Wage Differentials Received by Workers on Dangerous Jobs, 16 J. HuM.
RESOURCES 167 (1981) (empirical study confirming that workers are compensated for the
risk of experiencing a nonfatal or fatal accident and finding that union employees were
paid higher premiums), and Smith, Compensating Wage Differential and Public Policy:
A Review, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 339 (1979) (providing a survey and bibliography of
research on wage differentials related to dangerousness).
54. Professor Viscusi suggests that compliance will occur where:
Expected No. AverageExpected costs _ Probability X of violations X penalty per
of compliance inspection per inspection violation
Viscusi, supra note 45, at 259.
55. By 1983, the probability of inspection was less than 1:200 annually; fewer than
two violations were found on the average inspection; and the average penalty imposed
was $60. Thus, the cost per worker of violating the Act was $0.57. Viscusi considers this
"too modest to create truly effective financial incentives for safety." Id. Sometimes, fines
should not be set to prohibit an activity absolutely; a violation might be desirable where
a compelling economic benefit would result. Comment, Criminal Sentences for Corpora-
tions: Alternative Fining Mechanisms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 443, 444-45 (1985).
56. Because OSHA's approach to safety regulation takes the form of specific, technol-
ogy-based prohibitions, rather than minimum performance standards, low fines are en-
tirely appropriate in some areas. Low fines for minor violations seem to counteract the
stiffness and inefficiencies of the specific prohibitions approach. The best alternative
might be to rely on a performance approach, forcing firms to achieve a given level of
safety but allowing them to decide how best to reach that level. Viscusi, supra note 45, at
248.
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alties for violations have decreased;5 some penalties are further
diminished up to thirty percent if, once the violations are de-
tected, the firm demonstrates a serious effort to comply. 8
In addition to regulatory fines, the Act provides criminal pen-
alties for some violations. Section 666(e) establishes criminal lia-
bility for willful violations of the statute that cause an em-
ployee's death.59 This section does not, however, effectively deter
employee endangerment.
Theoretical limitations preclude section 666(e) from protect-
ing employees. First, only employee deaths trigger the section;
the Act does not authorize intervention even when lives are en-
dangered. Nor does the language reach injuries, regardless of
their severity. Second, employers must violate the statute will-
fully. Aside from problems of proof in determining willfulness, a
technical gap in the regulations could allow an employer who
knew he was endangering his employees to go unpunished. Fi-
nally, the Act sets the maximum fine at a level that often bears
no relationship to the economic benefits of the violation. Larger
fines might deter otherwise profitable violations. Therefore,
given the present fines and level of enforcement, employers may,
in fact, be maximizing profits by choosing, with virtual impu-
nity, to endanger their employees' lives.6
Practical difficulties further undermine the effectiveness of
section 666(e). Of primary concern is the limited use of the pro-
vision. In the first twelve years of OSHA, prosecutors pursued
only twelve section 666(e) cases. 1 Where prosecutors obtained
convictions, the court imposed minimal sentences and never or-
dered incarceration.2 Individual actors were convicted in only
two cases; both convictions followed guilty or nolo contendere
57. Id. at 253-55. In 1985, OSHA fines totalled $16 million less than in 1980. At the
same time, workplace deaths increased 21% from 1983 to a total of 3750 in 1985 and
work-related injuries and illnesses rose 13.5% to 5.5 million. Stone, supra note 7, at 14A,
cols. 2-3.
58. Viscusi, supra note 45, at 256. Penalty reductions for post-detection compliance
efforts diminish the threat of random inspection and, with it, the likelihood of compli-
ance. Id. at 257.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1982).
60. Proposed legislation would impose criminal penalties on managers for failure to
warn workers and to notify a federal agency about dangers in the workplace. House Bill
Would Set Criminal Penalties for Nondisclosure-of Hazards, 867 Empl. Safety & Health
Guide (CCH) 2 (Dec. 22, 1987) [hereinafter House Bill] (discussing the Corporate Crimi-
nality Act of 1987).
61. Note, A Proposal to Restructure Sanctions Under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act: The Limitations of Punishment and Culpability, 91 YALE L.J. 1446, 1448 &
n.17 (1982).
62. Id. at 1449.
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pleas and merely resulted in probation. Individual corporate
agents escaped conviction in the remaining ten cases s The fact
that so few criminal cases have been brought does not indicate
that few willful violations lead to employee deaths. Instead, the
dearth of cases indicates that the Occupational Safety and
Health Act prefers to handle these cases on a civil rather than a
criminal basis."
Several reasons for this preference exist. The delays and heavy
burdens of proof in criminal trials discourage section 666(e) ac-
tions.6 5 Furthermore, OSHA lawyers cannot prosecute criminal
cases on their own; they must recruit a United States Attorney
to bring the case.66 Budgetary constraints of both OSHA and the
Justice Department reduce the likelihood of a section 666(e)
prosecution. 7 Thus, the limited threat of prosecution and con-
viction under section 666(e) undermines any deterrent effect on
corporations and corporate officials; employee endangerment
remains.
These failings of the regulatory system motivated the criminal
law approach used in Film Recovery Systems. Ironically, how-
ever, the presence of unenforced federal regulations may prevent
states from applying criminal law sanctions to corporations that
endanger the health and safety of their employees. Some courts
have found that OSHA preempts the states' application of crim-
inal statutes to dangerous workplace conditions. 8 Although pre-
emption has been attacked as contrary to the legislative intent
behind the Act,6" some have suggested that federal action is nec-
essary to explicitly rebut preemption arguments and empower
the states to act.
70
63. Id. at 1449-50.
64. Id. at 1450.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1451.
67. Id.
68. E.g., People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 157 Ill. App. 3d 797, 801, 510 N.E.2d
1173, 1176 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (finding that OSHA preempts state criminal law when
corporations expose their employees to hazardous conditions).
69. Note, Getting Away With Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal
Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARv. L. REv. 535 (1987).
70. See House Bill, supra note 60 (statements of Elizabeth Holtzman, District Attor-
ney for Kings County, New York, and Ira Reiner, District Attorney for Los Angeles,
California).
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B. The Civil Law Approach
In addition to the regulatory approach, an employee or his es-
tate can initiate a civil action against a corporation for acts of
negligence. Civil actions for personal injury or wrongful death
aim to compensate the victims of unreasonable corporate con-
duct.71 In addition, civil remedies against the corporation can
provide some measure of deterrence; the potential liability for
damages may cause a corporation to avoid employee-endanger-
ing activities.72
Corporate cost-benefit analysis, however, limits the effective-
ness of this deterrent. Thus, where the expected benefits-profit
maximization or other corporate goals-outweigh the potential
costs of lawsuits, corporate management may conclude that the
provision of fewer employee safeguards is a desirable course of
conduct.73 To the extent that the expected costs of civil liability
are low, 74 especially where they can be passed on to the con-
sumer, 75 deterrence is undermined.
The civil law approach is inadequate for several other reasons
as well. First, the inefficiencies of litigation give both plaintiffs
and defendants the incentive to settle disputes out of court.
Plaintiffs seek to settle to avoid the inconveniences of litigation
and to be compensated sooner. Corporate defendants seek
quick settlements to minimize costs of litigation,77 to avoid the
71. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 1-25-6 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
72. Id. § 4-25-26.
73. Cost-benefit analysis of civil liability parallels that of regulatory liability. See
supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
74. The expected cost of civil liability is a function of both the present value of the
damages awarded and the probability of their assessment.
75. Modern American corporate theory presumes that the price mechanism will
phase out companies with extensive civil liabilities. Because the price of a product in a
competitive market equals the costs of production, A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND ECONOMics 86 (1983), firms with higher costs of production will be at a compet-
itive disadvantage. Their economic profit, the difference between total revenue and total
costs, will be less than zero; that is, the opportunity costs of continuing in that business
exceed the returns to the owners, and those owners rationally may choose to engage in
another business. See W. NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICA-
TION 183 (4th ed. 1987).
76. Civil cases in many metropolitan areas may be delayed more than five years. Huf-
stedler & Nejelski, A.B.A. Action Commission Challenges Litigation Cost and Delay, 66
A.B.A. J. 965, 966 (1980).
77. Litigation costs go beyond attorneys' fees and court costs and may include frozen
assets and many employee hours to gather information, give depositions, ard testify at
trial. Janofsky, A.B.A. Attacks Delay and the High Cost of Litigation, 65 A.B.A. J. 1323,
1323 (1979).
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risk of exorbitant judgments 78 and to avoid bad publicity.79 Sec-
ond, civil law reaches the corporation, not the individual deci-
sionmaker. Even if the individual corporate actor is named as a
defendant, she is likely to be indemnified for her expenses8 o
Furthermore, corporations merely include potential judgments
in their cost-benefit analyses.81 Thus, although the civil law does
serve a valuable compensatory function, it fails to deter many
cases of employee endangerment. As a result of this failure,
prosecutors increasingly are relying on the criminal law to con-
trol corporate decisionmaking 2
III. THE TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL LAW APPROACH: INHERENTLY
INADEQUATE TO ADDRESS EMPLOYEE ENDANGERMENT
The imposition of criminal responsibility on the corporation
to punish and deter undesirable conduct, like the imposition of
traditional regulatory and civil liability, has been largely unsuc-
cessful. After years of debate regarding whether a corporation
could be found guilty of a crime that required a specific criminal
intent, the courts have resolved the issue in favor of extending
78. Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALip. L. REV.
772, 779 (1985). The threat of punitive damages further encourages out-of-court settle-
ments, even for meritless claims. Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1156 (1984).
79. Sales & Cole, supra note 78, at 1158 n.183; Special Project, Self-Help: Extrajudi-
cial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 845, 1019 (1984).
80. Generally, corporations may-indemnify corporate agents if they acted in good
faith, in the best interest of the corporation, and, in some states, had no reasonable cause
to believe their actions were illegal. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (Deering Supp.
1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.75 (1985).
Indemnification undermines the effectiveness of fines to individuals. Comment, supra
note 7, at 1445-46 & n.206. Despite the promise of indemnification, an employee may feel
somewhat constrained by potential liability. When an employer repeatedly indemnifies
an employee, the employer may ultimately consider the employee too costly and replace
him.
81. As in the regulatory context, where corporations estimate the likelihood and
amount of sanctions, the threat of civil liability forces corporations to consider the fre-
quency and amount of civil judgments. See supra note 54. Corporations may, however,
insure themselves against some civil liability. Where insurance protects the corporation,
potential judgments are irrelevant to the corporation's cost-benefit analysis.
82. Because criminal liability has not yet fully developed to deter employee endan-
germent, the courts rely on punitive or exemplary damages in the civil context. This
approach inappropriately places the individual plaintiff in the role of prosecutor. The
criminal justice system, not the tort system, should operate to protect the public from
socially unacceptable threats. Cf. Lewin, Punitive Costs: Insurance Issue, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 11, 1984. at D2. col. 3.
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criminal liability to corporate entities.83 The requisite mental
state can be imputed to a corporation from the actions or the
mental state of its agents. 4
The threat of criminal liability, however, is still not an effec-
tive deterrent. Most actions proceed against the party least
likely to be deterred by the threat of a criminal conviction, the
corporate entity, and not the individual decisionmaker. Low
prosecution, as well as conviction, rates and sentences that are
readily incorporated into the corporation's cost-benefit analysis
characterize corporate criminal justice and contribute to inade-
quate deterrence. Because the system of criminal law is unable
to punish or deter corporations effectively, and because it sel-
dom reaches the corporation's decisionmakers, it fails to prevent
corporate decisions that endanger employees. '
A. The Criminal Law Approach
In addition to agency initiated regulatory actions and victim
initiated civil actions, federal and state prosecutors increasingly
are pursuing criminal actions for culpable corporate decision-
making.8 5 Statutes impose criminal responsibility for corporate
conduct on both the corporate entity and its officers.8 0 When
employee deaths are involved, state prosecutors can pursue in-
dictments for an appropriate degree of criminal homicide, charg-
83. A summary of the debate regarding corporate criminal liability is found in Note,
Individual Liability of Agents for Corporate Crimes Under the Proposed Federal Crimi-
nal Code, 31 VAND. L. REV. 965, 967-68 & nn.5-6 (1978). Comment, supra note 7, at 1412,
1415-24, reviews corporate homicide issues.
84. People v. Film Recovery Systems, No. 83-11091, slip op. at 9-10 (Cook County,
Ill. Cir. Ct. June 14, 1985), argued, Nos. 85-1853, 85-1855 (Ill. Ct. App. July 7, 1987); see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 & comment 2 (1985) (holding corporations responsible
for some of the acts of their agents). For a discussion of the history of corporate liability
for crimes of intent, focusing on corporate homicide, see Note, Corporate Homicide: A
New Assault on Corporate Decision-making, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 911 (1979).
85. See supra note 7.
86. Corporations are considered "persons" under the law. E.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-15 (1985); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(8)(a) (1985). Corpo-
rate responsibility arises when an agent of the corporation commits an offense while act-
ing in the scope of his employment and on behalf of the corporation. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 5-4(1) (1985); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1985). For serious crimes, most
states require that the crime is authorized, requested, commanded, or performed by the
board of directors or a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment
and on behalf of the corporation. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 5-4(2) (1985); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.07(I)(c) (1985).
An individual is legally accountable for any conduct he performs or causes to be per-
formed in the name of or on behalf of the corporation as if it was done in his own name
or on his own behalf. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 5-5 (1985); MODEL PENAL CODE
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ing corporate defendants with negligent homicide, manslaughter,
or murder.
8 7
Negligent homicide applies where an actor failed to perceive
risks and such failure represented a gross deviation from the
standard a reasonable person would observe, given the actor's
situation. Guilt flows from a finding that a corporation or an
individual actor was negligent in failing to perceive a job-related
risk that results in an employee's death. If blameworthiness ex-
ceeds this standard of negligence, prosecutors can resort to more
serious charges-manslaughter and murder.8"
Actions causing an employee's death may constitute man-
slaughter if they are committed recklessly. 0 Reckless conduct
occurs when the actor "consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk."'" Thus, corporate and individual responsibil-
ity for manslaughter arises when corporate decisionmakers ig-
§ 2.07(6)(a)-(c) & comment 7 (1985). For a discussion of individual liability, see
Spurgeon & Fagan, Criminal Liability for Life-Endangering Corporate Conduct, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 400, 425 (1981).
87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (1980).
88. Id. § 210.4 & comment 1; see also id. § 2.02.
89. Employee endangerment will often arise from a conscious decision to subject em-
ployees to risks or not to provide additional safety measures to minimize risks. Attribut-
ing the creation of risk to conscious decisionmaking processes means that intent is satis-
fied so prosecutors can look to manslaughter and murder statutes in addition to
negligent homicide statutes.
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(a) (1980); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
91. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
A person acts recklessly. . . when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disre-
gard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law abiding
person would observe in the actor's situation.
Id.; see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 4-6 (1985). Because recklessness incorporates the
notion of justifiability, some conscious decisions may not be blameworthy. The criminal
law, therefore, recognizes conflicting social goals-the desire for progress and the obliga-
tion to protect human life. The balance between the benefits of a corporation's contribu-
tion to society and the harm to employees determines both the blameworthiness and the
criminality of the act. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 418-19 & n.10. When the
act's social utility is high, the risks are evident to both employer and employee, and the
activity cannot feasibly be made safer, corporate decisionmakers may choose to pursue
an activity in which employee deaths are statistically certain. That decision will most
likely be exempt from criminal prosecution. See Greenhouse, supra note 5, at D2, col. 1.
The example of social justification most often quoted in the law school classroom is
that of building construction. Statistics show that at least one death is likely to occur in
the construction of a skyscraper; yet as long as all reasonable safety measures are taken,
the social utility of the end-product justifies the risk, and no criminal liability arises. For
a discussion of the difficulties of defining blameworthy conduct that incorporates the
ideas of social utility, see Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 416-20.
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nore a significant and unjustifiable workplace hazard and that
hazard causes the death of an employee.
The corporation and its employees can be charged with mur-
der if the actor commits the homicide intentionally or "reck-
lessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference
to the value of human life." 92 When an actor intends to kill or do
great bodily harm to another, or knows with certainty that his
acts will cause death or serious injury, the actor, absent a lawful
justification such as self-defense, has clearly committed mur-
der.93 Likewise, when another's death flows from an actor's con-
duct and the actor knows that his acts "create[d] a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to another," 4 he may
be guilty of murder.
The distinction between manslaughter and murder in cases of
corporate or agent responsibility turns on the degree of reckless-
ness. According to the Model Penal Code, one acts recklessly
when one chooses to disregard a significant risk that cannot be
justified by the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct.95
Proof of recklessness is sufficient to sustain a charge of man-
slaughter. For murder, however, the state must also prove that,
given the circumstances, the defendant's recklessness manifested
an extreme indifference to the value of human life.9"
B. Inadequacies of the Criminal Law Approach
Although the criminal law now treats corporations as per-
sons,97 some aspects of the criminal law do not relate well to
corporate structures and functions. Relying on traditional crimi-
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1) (1980).
[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indif-
ference to the value of human life ....
Id.
93. Id.; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp. 1987)
(repealed July 1, 1987) (statute applied in Film Recovery Systems, supra note 14).
94. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp. 1987) (repealed July
1, 1987).
95. See supra note 91.
96. Proving that a defendant knew the magnitude of the risk and yet proceeded on
the path endangering employees suggests the defendant's indifference to the risk or be-
lief in the justifiability of the risk. If the utility of the act is great enough, it will be more
difficult to prove that the defendant's state of mind "manifested an extreme indifference
to the value of human life."
97. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-15 (1985); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.13(8)(a) (1985); see also Note, supra note 84, at 912.
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nal mechanisms-negligent homicide, manslaughter, and mur-
der-to punish and deter employee endangerment will not be ef-
fective in practice. Problems in assessing culpability and
enforcing these provisions, coupled with an inability to perceive
corporate officials as homicidal agents, undermine the potential
of the traditional criminal law to achieve these goals.
1. The decisionmaking stage: the problem of moral neutral-
ity- The traditional criminal homicide provisions cannot be ap-
plied effectively to corporate crime. They fail to give adequate
notice to corporations and their decisionmakers that their ac-
tions fall within the scope of these statutory prohibitions and
fail to set adequate guidelines to govern corporate behavior. The
nature of the corporation further complicates efforts to apply
these laws to corporate actors. Conflicting legal mandates for
corporate decisionmakers' duties,98 diffused responsibility for
decisionmaking,99 and perception problems0 " frustrate attempts
to hold corporate decisionmakers responsible for criminal
homicide.
a. Corporate purpose: conflicting goals and the duty of
moral neutrality- The purpose of the corporation and the re-
sponsibilities that state law imposes on the corporation and cor-
porate decisionmakers create conflicting duties. Microeconomic
theory assumes that, as fiduciaries for the corporation's owners,
the corporation and all corporate decisionmakers will act ratio-
nally to maximize profits.10 1 Unfortunately, corporate profit
maximization may conflict with other societal goals, such as pro-
tecting the environment, providing jobs, and assuring the health
and safety of employees.102 Whether, and under what circum-
stances, the corporation and its decisionmakers lawfully can or
98. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
101. R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, EcONOMICS 347 (4th ed. 1975). Corporations may finance
their activities by soliciting capital from investors. In exchange for the use of this capital,
investors become owners and expect a return on their initial investments. Corporate
management, in attempting to meet these shareholder expectations, owes a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and, to some extent, to shareholders. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 611-12 (1983).
Some critics of the profit-maximization theory claim, however, that it ignores corpo-
rate decisionmakers' other duties and motivations. They propose other explanations for
corporate behavior such as satisficing behavior, sales maximization, and long-run profit
maximization. For a discussion of these hypotheses, see R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra, at
353-56.
102. See supra note 52 (stating that the profit motive is so strong that deci-
sionmakers are reluctant to adopt any voluntary safety measures; instead, they wait for
regulations that require compliance).
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ethically should pursue these societal goals despite a conflict
with profit maximization remains unclear.
10 3
b. Corporate structure: individual anonymity breeds neu-
trality- Even if corporate officials are allowed to consider social
goals, the structure of the corporation obscures moral blame.
The organizational bureaucracy and the competition within and
between corporations tend to shape the moral perspective of
decisionmakers and to diminish social responsibility. 104 As the
chain of command lengthens, decisionmakers become more
anonymous and less accountable. Corporate officials may thus
adopt policies or procedures that create or contribute to life-en-
dangering situations without viewing themselves as engaging in
blameworthy conduct. 05 Far removed from the consequences of
their decisions, corporate officials may never feel or be held
responsible.
c. Corporate decisionmakers: self-perceived as morally neu-
tral, rational actors, not criminals- The fiduciary obligations
of corporate decisionmakers to shareholders and the peculiari-
ties of organizational behavior lead many executives to view
themselves as morally neutral actors. 06 The result is an unwill-
ingness or an inability to accept their decisions as blamewor-
thy. 0 7 Even when they may admit blame, corporate officials do
not see themselves in the same light as street criminals, particu-
larly those responsible for murder or manslaughter.10 8
In addition, the criminalization of morally neutral behavior
has strengthened this perception. Legislators increasingly have
relied on the criminal law to shape corporate behavior.0 9 They
have created a long list of technical violations that carry crimi-
nal penalties. 10 This overcriminalization of essentially morally
103. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 412-14; see also Note, supra note 43, at
184 (describing the conflict between duties to shareholders and obligations to
employees).
104. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 413; Note, supra note 83, at 967 n.5.
105. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 414.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Indeed, most corporate managers will not identify with the Film Recovery Sys-
tems defendants. See supra note 35. These corporate decisionmakers often fail to see
their life-endangering conduct as blameworthy. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at
414; see also Spiegel, The Liability of Corporate Officers, 71 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1985, at 48,
50 (noting the differences between street crime and corporate crime and the more com-
plicated causal relationships in the latter).
109. Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholar-
ship, 17 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 501 (1980).
110. Professor Orland notes that
The corporate community properly dismisses as "technical" corporate convic-
tions for violating statutes dealing with neutral conduct, such as failing to keep
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neutral conduct "demeans the seriousness of criminal convic-
tions in the eyes of corporate executives, prosecutors and
judges,"'' 1 and undermines the deterrent effect intended by the
initial criminalization."'
Corporate decisionmakers may rationalize risk to an employee
as necessary to corporate operations."' Thus, as long as corpo-
rate actors have not violated any of the laws specifically regulat-
ing their decisionmaking, they still see themselves as having
clean hands. Corporate practices, therefore, pose several barriers
to the successful application of traditional criminal homicide
laws. The fiduciary duty of corporate decisionmakers, their ano-
nymity in the corporate structure, and their perceptions of their
role obscure accountability and make application of the laws of
criminal homicide to situations of employee endangerment
difficult.
2. The enforcement stage: the problems of corporate and in-
dividual liability for corporate crime- Ill-suited enforcement
mechanisms frustrate the criminal justice system's efforts to de-
ter employee endangerment. Faced with criminal corporate be-
havior, the criminal justice system underprosecutes, undercon-
victs, and undersanctions.
a. Underprosecution of corporate crime- The prosecution
of corporate executives under current law for the death of an
employee from hazardous activities or conditions is unlikely. Se-
rious corporate crime has always been underprosecuted." 4 Ex-
proscribed records for stockyards (7 U.S.C. § 221: three-year maximum penalty)
or for dealing in fluid milk 'without the requisite permit (7 U.S.C. § 63: one-year
maximum penalty). But the corporate community also dismisses as "technical"
convictions involving truly culpable conduct such as willful tax evasion and con-
spiracy to defraud the United States.
Id. at 519 n.97.
111. Id. at 519.
112. Moral blame associated with a criminal conviction can be an effective deterrent,
but the overcriminalization of corporate behavior diminishes the blameworthiness associ-
ated with a criminal conviction, and, as a result, the effectiveness of the criminal law as a
deterrent. See Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 414.
113. When corporate managers believe they are paying higher wages to compensate
employees for taking greater risks, see supra note 53, these rationalizations seem more
reasonable.
114. Orland, supra note 109, at 519. Corporate crime is often underprosecuted be-
cause it is too time-consuming and too costly. Where a serious crime is alleged, corpora-
tions will spend substantial sums to defend the charges. In the Pinto case, State v. Ford
Motor Co., No. 11-431 (Pulaski County, Ind. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 13, 1978, renumbered on
transfer, May 3, 1979), Ford spent well in excess of one million dollars in defending
charges of reckless homicide and criminal recklessness that carried maximum penalties
of $30,000. P. DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 136 (1984),
Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 426. In contrast, the prosecution had a mere
$20,000 budget for the case. Tiny Winamac, Ind., Disrupted by Frenzy of Ford Motor
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cept in cases where the facts present clearly culpable conduct, as
in Film Recovery Systems, prosecutors are unlikely to pursue
such serious criminal charges as murder or manslaughter.
In addition, the prosecution of individual decisionmakers is
unlikely because corporations tend to shield their executives
through plea bargaining. 115 The corporation may agree to plead
guilty or nolo contendere if the state dismisses the charges
against the individual actors." 6
b. Underconviction of corporate crime- Once the decision
has been made to prosecute corporations and individuals, con-
viction is far from assured. Although individual liability is desir-
able as a deterrent, successful prosecution of individual actors is
particularly difficult. Prosecutors must overcome a variety of
procedural, substantive, and psychological barriers.
First, prosecutors must be able to identify the responsible par-
ties and prove causation. The diffusion of decisionmaking au-
thority in the corporate structure, however, makes the identifica-
tion of responsible actors most difficult.' 7 Even where the actor
can be identified, the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the actor had the requisite knowledge or intent and
that the actor's decision to act caused the harm to the
employee." 8
Trial, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1980, at 15, col. 5. For a better understanding of the impact of
these resource disparities, see Warren & Kelly, Inside the Pinto Trial, AM. LAW., Apr.
1980, at 28.
115. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 429. For example,
[i]n United States v. Hughey Construction Corp., No. CR-81-16D (W.D. Okla.,
information filed Jan. 23, 1981, superseding information filed Feb. 27, 1981,
guilty plea entered Feb 27, 1981, sentence imposed Feb. 27, 1981), an insuffi-
ciently supported five-foot deep trench caved in, killing an employee. Criminal
charges were brought on two counts against the corporate employer and two of
its executives. A plea agreement, however, resulted in a guilty plea by the corpo-
ration and the dropping of charges against the two individuals. The corporation
was fined $7,500 on each of the two counts.
Radin, Corporate Criminal Liability for Employee-endangering Activities, 18 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 39, 66 (1983).
116. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 429. Inadequate sanctioning of corpora-
tions encourages these pleas. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
118. In People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660 (1980), the
court adopted an unduly narrow interpretation of causation. "The court said, in effect,
that there must be a forceful demonstration that the corporate actor's acts or omissions
were the cause of a crime, and not merely the creation of a dangerous workplace condi-
tion." Note, supra note 43, at 225. Another writer proposed a better standard: "Individu-
als with knowledge of criminal conduct should be culpable if they are in a position to
deter the conduct but fail to act." Comment, supra note 7, at 1441.
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Second, prosecutors must be able to obtain jurisdiction over
the potential defendants.1 9 This prerequisite is easily met for
the corporation; it is subject to criminal prosecution wherever it
does business.1 20 Executives of a corporation located in one
state, however, may require the forum state to request extradi-
tion of the executive to face trial. In some instances states may
protect their businesspersons and refuse extradition.121 Thus, in-
dividual actors may be beyond the jurisdictional reach of the
state trial court.
Finally, even when these procedural and substantive barriers
are overcome, prosecutors face a far more serious hur-
dle-persuading the jury that the corporate executives on trial
should be held responsible for murder or manslaughter. Like the
corporate executives' self-perceptions, the public perception of
corporate executives is fundamentally inconsistent with that of
murder and manslaughter defendants.1 22 To find a plant man-
ager or vice president guilty of murder or manslaughter would
probably require a juror to redefine her notion of culpability for
that crime.2 S Especially in cases where the individual defendant
had no direct interaction with the endangering activities, the
jury is likely to conclude that the decisionmaking was too re-
mote and the defendant is not guilty. 24 Thus, a gap in jurors'
119. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 429. The drafters of the Model Penal Code
retained corporate criminal responsibility, in part because they recognized that the guilty
individual may not be within the jurisdiction of the state. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07
comment 2(c) (1985).
120. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 107-13 (1985).
121. Those charged with crimes in one state but not present for trial may be extra-
dited to stand trial. Extradition is discretionary. See California v. Superior Court, 107 S.
Ct. 2433, 2438-39 (1987) (listing grounds for refusing extradition request). In most states,
it is governed by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 60,
paras. 18-49 (1985). The Governor of Utah denied extradition of a former company-vice
president in Film Recovery Systems. Greenhouse, supra note 4, at A29, col. 4.
122. Because Film Recovery Systems was a bench trial, it does not support the pro-
position that a jury is willing to convict corporate actors for murder or manslaughter.
123. Juries hesitate to convict corporations and their officers of crimes. Note, supra
note 61, at 1451; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 comment 2(c) (1985).
124. Jury sympathy for defendants charged with crimes committed in the course of
their employment, combined with the remoteness of the injury and the diffusion of re-
sponsibility, may make conviction difficult. Note, supra note 61, at 1456 & n.53. Jury
concerns about sentencing "respectable people" may also account for some acquittals. Cf.
P. DIPERNA, supra note 114, at 190.
These sentiments may explain why juries often acquit corporate agents yet convict the
corporation. This result is inconsistent with the theory that a corporation acts through
its agents. One commentator concluded:
This phenomenon perhaps reflects an intuitive feeling by jurors that individuals
acting within the pressures of a bureaucratic and sometimes highly diffuse cor-
porate structure are often unwitting or even unwilling participants in an illegal
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perceptual maps is likely to frustrate attempts to prosecute cul-
pable conduct by corporate decisionmakers.
c. Ineffective sanctions for corporate crime- Convicted cor-
porations are seldom adequately punished; verdicts are often
more symbolic than effective. Because the corporation is a legal
fiction that cannot be imprisoned, courts rely on fines as crimi-
nal sanctions against the corporation.'25 Like regulatory fines,
criminal fines are neither large enough nor certain enough to
achieve their purposes.1 26 Courts tend to overlook other op-
tions-dissolving a corporation, 27 placing it on probation, 2 8 or
revoking its operating licenses 123-as substitutes for or supple-
ments to these fines. The result is a system of sanctions that is,
at best, ineffective.
Convictions of individual actors for many corporate crimes are
highly unlikely because corporations tend to shield' 30 or indem-
nify' their officers. Criminal homicide charges against an indi-
transaction, and that a criminal conviction is too harsh a sanction for business
misconduct that is not of a highly immoral or detestable character.
Note, supra note 83, at 968.
125. Comment, supra note 55, at 443; Comment, Probation for Corporations Under
the Sentencing Reform Act, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 785, 789 (1986). The overriding
purpose of these fines is deterrence. Comment, supra note 55, at 446. The inability to
imprison a corporation for corporate misconduct was at the heart of the debate over
whether corporations could be held responsible for certain crimes. Although that issue
has been resolved, debate continues over the best ways to sanction corporations for crim-
inal behavior. See supra note 84.
126. Orland, supra note 109, at 519; Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 427; Note,
Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanc-
tions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 285-87 (1961); see also supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
See generally Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386 (1981).
127. Comment, supra note 125, at 789.
128. Probation has been used on a very limited basis. Two factors may explain this.
First, probation requires a continuing relationship between the court and the corpora-
tion. Success depends on the court's ability to supervise the convicted corporation. This
constant monitoring is not only a heavy burden for the judicial system, but it is highly
inefficient. On a large scale, these problems may be cost prohibitive. Comment, supra
note 55, at 445 & n.10. Second, until 1984, some question existed as to the propriety of
placing corporations on probation. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, 98 Stat. 1988 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (Supp. III 1985)) answered this question.
Comment, supra note 125 (analyzing the application of the Act and guidelines for corpo-
rate probation); see also Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A
New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353 (1979).
129. Many jurisdictions require some types of corporations to apply for and maintain
general operating licenses or licenses to handle specific materials. Abuse of health and
safety or other regulations could justify revoking these licenses. Many courts, however,
have been reluctant to invoke these sanctions.
130. See supra notes 115-16 ard accompanying text.
131. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Although indemnification is an im-
portant consideration in assessing the effectiveness of individual liability for many
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vidual corporate actor, however, may serve as a more effective
deterrent. The impact of a criminal conviction of corporate of-
ficers upon those similarly situated will likely be very significant.
The imprisoned official must bear the burden of his punishment
alone; he cannot shift it to shareholders, customers, or other em-
ployees. Without criminal accountability, the consequences of
corporate decisionmaking are often remote, borne externally by
the employee; with criminal accountability, however, each deci-
sionmaker must internalize those consequences. The possibilfties
of conviction-and the stigma and loss of freedom that may fol-
low-may deter corporate decisionmakers, particularly white-
collar executives, from socially unacceptable behavior. 132 Thus,
real threats of individual punishment may deter employee
endangerment.
Unfortunately, as the likelihood of detection, prosecution, and
conviction diminishes, such deterrence is lost. Therefore, the
structural bias against the conviction of individual executives
undermines a potentially powerful deterrent device. The result
is a system in which neither corporations nor corporate deci-
sionmakers feel compelled by the criminal law to consider em-
ployee health and safety.
IV. PROPOSED ENDANGERMENT OFFENSE
The current judicial and legislative approaches have proven
ineffective in handling cases of employee endangerment. Regula-
tion discourages some risks,133 the civil law serves a compensa-
tory function,1 3 4 but two purposes of the criminal
law-retribution and deterrence-are not well served.135 To dis-
courage employee-endangering activities requires a new ap-
proach-one that reflects the traditional views of culpability and
criminality and puts both corporate actors and the public on no-
crimes, it will probably not have much of an impact in murder or manslaughter cases
because imprisonment is likely.
132. Because corporate executives are generally members of social groups that value
status and freedom of action, realistic threats of imprisonment are especially effective
deterrents. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 86, at 429 & n.144 (quoting Geis, Deterring
Corporate Crime, in THE CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AcCOUNTABILITY 349 (R. Nader ed.
1973)); see also Fisse, The Social Policy of Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 6 ADEL.
L. REv. 361 (1978); Geis, Criminal Penalties for Corporate Criminals, 8 CRiM. L. BULL.
377 (1972).
133. See supra notes 38-70 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 83-139 and accompanying text.
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tice of the criminal responsibilities of corporate decisionmakers.
Such an approach will provide a more effective deterrent against
decisions that expose workers to socially unacceptable risks.
A. Previous Proposals
Numerous proposals have sought to impose criminal liability
on corporate actors for employee endangerment. In 1977, the
United States Senate considered section 403(c) of the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code."s' The proposed offense addressed the
136.
A person responsible for supervising particular activities on behalf of an organi-
zation who, by his reckless failure to supervise adequately those activities, per-
mits or contributes to the commission of an offense by the organization is crimi-
nally liable for the offense, except that if the offense committed [sic] by the
organization is a felony the person is liable under this subsection only for a Class
A misdemeanor.
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403(c) (1977) (Pro-
posed Code).
The 96th Congress reintroduced an endangerment offense. Section 1617 of the Crimi-
nal Code Reform Act of 1979 provided:
(a) OFFENSE. - A person is guilty of an offense if he engages in conduct that he
knows places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily in-
jury, and -
(1) his conduct in the circumstances manifests an extreme indifference to
human life; or
(2) his conduct in the circumstances manifests an unjustified disregard for
human life.
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979, S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1617 (1979) (Pro-
posed Code) (cited in Radin, supra note 115, at 69).
This provision was considerably broader than § 403(c) of the 1977 Proposed Code. It
encompassed all endangerment and did not limit its focus to culpable supervisory activi-
ties. It, therefore, mirrored many of the mistakes of state reckless endangerment of-
fenses. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1980), providing:
A person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which
places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
Recklessness and danger shall be presumed where a person knowingly points a
firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believed the
firearm to be loaded.
These provisions, like those of traditional criminal homicide laws, falter in application
because of the lack of notice, the inability of corporate managers, judges, and jurors to
perceive these statutes as applicable, and the other problems discussed supra notes 97-
132 and accompanying text.
Legislators have recognized the need for specificity in endangerment provisions and
have responded with offenses focused on particular activities. For example, the public
welfare provision at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(e) (West Supp. 1986) provides:
Any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, disposes of, or exports any
hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter or used oil not identi-
fied or listed as a hazardous wqste . . . who knows at that time that he thereby
places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury,
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $250,000 or impris-
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issue of "reckless supervision"-oversight recklessness in execu-
tion and permitting or contributing to the commission of a crim-
inal offense as its result. The proposal, however, contained sev-
eral flaws.
First, it required the commission of an offense by the supervi-
sor's organization as a condition precedent to individual criminal
liability.137 This requirement would have precluded an individ-
ual indictment unless the corporation or other entity had been
adjudicated guilty.'38 Only after an employee was injured or died
and the corporation was found guilty of murder or manslaughter
could the statute be applied to the supervisor. 39 The uncer-
tainty in proving the predicate offense would weaken the deter-
rent effect on individual decisionmakers. Thus, the Senate ap-
proach was ineffective.
Second, the proposal lacked an appropriate degree of propor-
tionality. When the conditions precedent had been met and the
corporation had been found guilty of a felony, the supervisor
could be charged with no more than a misdemeanor. 4 ° Conse-
quently, the statute, designed to address the very serious issue
of employee endangerment, failed to allow an appropriately seri-
ous sanction.
Third, the proposal was overly broad,' 4 ' holding liable anyone
who "permits or contributes to the commission of an offense. '1 42
Based on reckless supervision, the proposal did not require
knowledge of the endangerment as an element of the crime. It
onment for not more than fifteen years, or both. A defendant that is an organiza-
tion shall, upon conviction of violating this subsection, be subject to a fine of not
more than $1,000,000.
Because of the problems of a broadly constructed statute and the need for greater speci-
ficity, this Note focuses on § 403(c) of the 1977 Criminal Code Reform Act, supra. For a
discussion of § 1617, see Radin, supra note 115, at 68-74, and Spurgeon & Fagan, supra
note 86, at 405-09.
Endangerment proposals died in the 96th Congress. In 1981, the Senate introduced the
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981, S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Proposed
Code), to succeed the 1979 legislation. Radin, supra note 115, at 74. Notably absent was
an endangerment offense. Id. Similar bills in the House of Representatives also elimi-
nated the provision. Id.
137. Recent Development, Criminal Liability of Corporate Managers for Deaths of
Their Employees: People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 46 ALa. L. REv. 655, 679 (1982).
138. Id.
139. Liability for the predicate offense and liability for reckless supervision could
have been determined in a single trial but a guilty verdict for the latter could not be
obtained without a guilty verdict for the former.
140. The statute allows the prosecutor to charge the supervisor with the principal
offense where that offense is a misdemeanor, but it prevents him from equating the
charges where the principal crime is a felony.
141. Recent Development, supra note 137, at 680-81.
142. See supra note 136.
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failed to differentiate between a chief executive officer who
knowingly permitted or contributed to dangers to employees and
an officer who, as a poor supervisor, was not aware of the danger
to employees and so unknowingly permitted endangering activi-
ties. This proposal, therefore, would punish equally those deci-
sionmakers who engage in culpable conduct and those who are
merely reckless administrators. 4 s In doing so, it overreaches.
In response to the inadequacies of the Senate proposal, one
commentator proposed alternative statutory language.' 4 This
proposal appropriately removed the condition precedent provi-
sion of the Senate proposal and focused on supervisory person-
nel in a position to create, permit, or prevent a dangerous condi-
tion. 14 5 This second proposal allowed efficient delegation of
authority without criminal liability, except in those instances
where the supervisor knew that, in doing so, he contributed to a
"substantial and unjustifiable risk."'" In addition, it incorpo-
rated social utility analysis, 147 forcing the consideration of such
factors as the nature of the job, risk of injury, feasibility of pre-
cautions, and attention to safety. 48 If the activity creating the
risk was socially useful, necessary to achieve desired ends, and
pursued with the most care possible, no liability would result.
Finally, the proposal contained a defense for affirmative efforts
to prevent the continuation of the risk before death or injury
was imminent.'4 9
Although this second proposal incorporated the purposes and
refined the provisions of section 403(c), it failed to address sev-
eral of the inadequacies of both the current system and the Sen-
143. The broad scope of this coverage may explain why the reckless supervision of-
fense would have been only a misdemeanor. The crime may have been intended to force
managers to be good supervisors. Still, criminal liability for poor administrative skills
seems excessive and beyond notions of criminal culpability.
144.
A person responsible for supervising particular activities on behalf of an organi-
zation who, in failing to supervise adequately those activities, knowingly permits
or contributes to the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of serious
physical injury or death to another and such injury or death occurs is guilty of a
class E felony. It is an affirmative defense to this section that the person affirma-
tively took steps to prevent the continued existence of the risk before death or
injury was imminent.
Recent Development, supra note 137, at 681.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 682.
147. Id. at 682-83.
148. Id. at 683. By incorporating the justifiability of the risk created, the proposal did
not outlaw all endangering activities; instead, it allowed corporate decisionmakers and
the courts to account for other social concerns.
149. Id.
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ate proposal. First, it retained death or injury as a prerequi-
site-no crime would be committed under the proposal until a
death or serious physical injury occurred in fact.' The affirma-
tive defense in the statute did not resolve this problem; it did
not encourage those who had knowledge of a dangerous situation
but had no power to alleviate the danger to come forward. Even
if such individuals did bring the endangerment to the attention
of public authorities, the authorities could take no action until
at least one employee died or was seriously injured. This propo-
sal, like the Senate proposal, could not prevent death or injury
before it occurred.
Second, this alternative to an overly broad Senate proposal
was itself overly broad. Although purporting to address em-
ployee endangerment, the proposal was much broader on its
face. Nowhere did the proposal limit its application to risks cre-
ated in the workplace; the statutory language addressed all risk-
creating activities. Thus, the proposal was as much a public wel-
fare provision as it was an employee endangerment provision. By
failing to narrow its applicability, the drafter failed to focus the
attention of corporate decisionmakers on risks created in the
workplace and let stand many of the problems of notice and per-
ceptions that currently exist.
Third, the proposal was ambiguous as to whether it proscribed
the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk or proscribed
the existence of such a risk. By its terms, the proposal applied
to an individual who "knowingly permits or contributes to the
creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk."' 5 If interpreted
literally, the proposal reached only those decisionmakers respon-
sible for adopting the risk-creating policy or procedure. Thus,
while the statute encouraged the risk-creator to take affirmative
steps to prevent the continued existence of a risk, it was devoid
of any incentive for others to do so.
In summary, despite vast improvements, this second proposal,
like the current system and that proposed by the Senate in sec-
tion 403(c), failed to provide sufficient preventive and curative
measures for the endangerment of employees.
As an alternative to the above proposals, the following statu-
tory language is proposed: 52
150. See supra note 144.
151. Recent Development, supra note 137, at 681.
152. Should courts find that OSHA preempts state criminal statutes in the area of
workplace safety, explicit federal action will be required to empower state criminal ac-
tions to ensure safety in the workplace. See supra notes 68-70.
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RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT OF AN EMPLOYEE
1. An organization, and any officer, manager, supervi-
sor, or similarly situated person responsible for adopt-
ing any policies or supervising any activities on behalf
of that organization, commits reckless endangerment
of an employee when the organization or the
individual:
(a) knowingly permits or contributes to the exis-
tence of conditions or activities that place an em-
ployee, or similarly situated person, in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury, and
(b) this conduct under the circumstances mani-
fests an unjustified disregard for human life.
2. It shall be an affirmative defense that the accused:
(a) made affirmative efforts to prevent or to dis-
continue the creation or persistence of the haz-
ardous condition before the danger of death or
injury was imminent or as soon as the danger
was known, and
(b) notified endangered employees of the endan-
gering condition or activity.
3. Reckless endangerment shall be punishable by a
fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for not
more than ten years, or both, if the defendant is an in-
dividual. A defendant that is an organization shall be
subject to a fine of not more than $1,000,000.
4. Proof of regulatory violations relating to the haz-
ardous condition shall be presumptive evidence of
knowledge for purposes of § 1(a).
Comments
1. Purpose- Under the Reckless Endangerment of an Em-
ployee statute, organizational decisionmakers are criminally re-
sponsible for enacting policies or supervising activities that they
know pose significant risks of death or severe bodily injury to
their employees. Criminal responsibility is imposed on those ac-
tors within the corporation that have the authority to adopt, al-
low, or alleviate endangering activities or conditions.
The statute accounts for the peculiarities of the corporate or
organizational context and is therefore preferable to the blind
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extension of the laws of criminal homicide to an entirely inap-
propriate context. It attempts to resolve the conflict between the
fiduciary duty of corporate decisionmakers to investors and the
duty of corporations to society in favor of overriding social goals
and imposes liability on executives to maintain these goals. The
language focuses explicitly on decisionmakers and provides clear
notice of the duty not to endanger employees.
The duty, accompanied by the threat of punishment, is
designed to introduce a new variable in the rationalistic calculus
of corporate or organizational decisionmaking. In addition, ju-
rors may be more likely to hold executives liable for crimes when
the statute explicitly makes them liable. The specific focus of
the statute circumvents the problem of preexisting perceptions
of the characteristics of criminals and the responsibilities of cor-
porate decisionmakers. The statute, therefore, seeks to reflect
and to help mold the expectations and duties of corporate of-
ficers in their own minds and in the minds of shareholders,
judges, prosecutors, and jurors. The specificity of the statute is
designed to encourage more frequent prosecution and conviction
of culpable corporate conduct, thereby increasing deterrence and
protecting employee health and safety.
2. Endangerment- Unlike previous proposals, the statute
does not require that death or serious bodily injury occur in fact.
The statute imposes liability for the act of endangerment itself,
not for its consequences. Thus, it reacts earlier to risks to em-
ployees. The adoption or implementation of a policy that creates
or allows a significant danger to the employee creates criminal
liability. Criminal responsibility, however, is limited by the re-
quirement that the danger be imminent." 3
3. Knowingly permits or contributes- The provision re-
quires that the actor "knowingly permits or contributes to" the
dangerous situation. The requirement ensures that liability is
limited to those corporate managers or other decisionmakers
who are in a position to create or alleviate the risk to employees.
Thus, those individuals with authority to prevent or cure the
dangerous situation are under a legal obligation to do so; those
who merely know a dangerous situation exists are not liable- for
failing to correct it.
153. The statute requires an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, not
the danger of imminent death or serious bodily injury. In doing so, it imposes criminal
responsibility on those corporate decisionmakers who choose to expose their employees
to long-term dangers such as exposure to radiation or asbestos. See Radin, supra note
115, at 72.
SPRING 19871
Journal of Law Reform
This requirement is consistent with the delegation required
for the efficient operation of any organizational structure. Hold-
ing corporate executives or any organizational decisionmakers
criminally liable for decisions made by their subordinates or
peers without their knowledge is both unrealistic and unjust.
Where a decisionmaker has delegated his authority to another in
good faith, he will not be held liable for this offense; however,
where he has delegated his authority to another and in doing so
has knowingly permitted or contributed to employee endanger-
ment, he is as accountable as the delegatee for the statutory of-
fense of Reckless Endangerment of an Employee.
4. Unjustified disregard- The statute does not outlaw all
endangering activities; it allows the fact finder to balance the
risk with social utility. For those situations when the end is suf-
ficiently desirable or necessary, no protection is feasible, no safer
means to attain that end is possible, and the employee is made
aware of the risks she faces, the decision to proceed with the
activity will not subject corporations or their agents to criminal
liability. When the prosecutor can prove that the end is not suf-
ficiently compelling, protection of the employee from the risk is
feasible, safer means to attain the same end are available, or the
employee is not made aware of the risk, liability will follow.
5. Affirmative defense- The affirmative defense serves two
purposes. First, it allows the individual decisionmaker to remove
himself from the reach of the law. In this manner, the applica-
tion of the statute is limited to culpable parties. Second, an af-
firmative defense encourages decisionmakers to correct situa-
tions that may place employees in danger.
CONCLUSION
Film Recovery Systems opened the door for courts to apply
murder and manslaughter statutes to corporate executives. Al-
though the decision shocked many, it did so not because the ac-
tions failed to warrant a criminal conviction, but because it held
corporate decisionmakers liable for murder. This approach, how-
evei, is inadequate. Judicial application of the traditional crimes
of murder and manslaughter to situations of employee endanger-
ment cannot effectively redress employee endangerment.
Society as a whole must address the issue of responsibility for
employee endangerment. Any potential solution must provide a
sound and consistent approach within the criminal law; it must
provide notice, predictability, and effective sanctions. The above
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proposal meets these criteria. In that proposal, state legislatures
have a more appropriate and effective alternative-a new of-
fense: Reckless Endangerment of an Employee.
-Anne D. Samuels

